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Ranking Sets of Objects

- S. Barberà, W. Bossert, P. Pattanaik
- Mathematics
- 2001

We provide a survey of the literature on ranking sets of objects. The interpretations of those set ranking include those employed in the theory of choice under complete uncertianty, rankings of… Expand

Voting by Committees

- S. Barberà, Hugo Sonnenschein, Lin Zhou
- Economics
- 1 May 1991

Problems of social choice frequently take the following form. There are n voters and a set K = (1,2,...,k) of objects. The voters must choose a subset of K. We define a class of voting schemes called… Expand

Strategy-proof social choice

- S. Barberà
- Economics
- 19 January 2010

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on… Expand

Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees

- S. Barberà, Faruk Gul, E. Stacchetti
- Economics
- 1 December 1993

Abstract We define a multidimensional analogue of a single-peaked preference and generalize the notion of a median voter scheme. Every onto strategy-proof social choice function on a single-peaked… Expand

Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems

- José Alcalde, S. Barberà
- Mathematics
- 1 May 1994

SummaryThis paper explores the possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms yielding satisfactory solutions to the marriage and to the college admissions problem. Our first result is negative.… Expand

Strategy-Proof Exchange

- S. Barberà, M. Jackson
- Economics
- 1995

We consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences. In such a setting, standard allocation rules such as… Expand

THE MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE MECHANISMS THAT DO NOT LEAVE "TOO MUCH" TO CHANCE'

- S. Barberà
- Economics
- 1 October 1977

In this paper we study the possibility of constructing satisfactory social choice mechanisms whose outcomes are determined by a combination of voting and chance. The following theorem is obtained: if… Expand

On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union

- S. Barberà, M. Jackson
- Economics
- 1 May 2004

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries,… Expand

Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings

- S. Barberà, P. Pattanaik
- Economics
- 1 May 1986

Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules

- S. Barberà, M. Jackson, A. Neme
- Mathematics
- 1997

We consider the problem of alloting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform… Expand

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